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MASTER AND SERVANT-INCOMPETENCY OF SERVANT:
NORTH DAKOTA ADOPTS THE RESTATEMENT'S
"SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT" TEST AND EXPLORES
THE PHENOMENON OF "TRANSFERENCE"
Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 N.D. 205, 571 N.W.2d 332
I. FACTS
In 1975, two-year old Twila Nelson, a developmentally disabled
child, became a client of Kidder County Social Services.' In 1990, when
Twila was sixteen years old, Kidder County attained temporary custody
of her, classified her as a "deprived child," and placed her in foster
care. 2 Kidder County assigned Vince Gillette as Twila's social worker to
do both case management and counseling.3
Twila's foster care ended in 1991 after her eighteenth birthday;
however, she continued to have contact with Gillette when he gave her
gratuitous rides within North Dakota to the homes of family and
friends. 4 In early 1992, Twila told a friend that Gillette had abused her
during their counseling sessions in his office, in his car, at the Bismarck
Pioneer Park, and at her mother's home.5 The allegations came to the
attention of Deborah Abbott, the Director of Kidder County Social
Services, who then instructed Gillette to stop giving Twila the gratuitous
rides. 6 Although she was aware that Twila had a history of sexual abuse
and sexual promiscuity, Abbott denied ever suspecting that Gillette was
abusing Twila.7
A police investigation into the allegations ensued and evidence of
sexual abuse was discovered. 8 Although no criminal prosecution was
brought, the Board of Social Work Examiners revoked Gillette's social
work license in 1993 after a formal investigation and hearing.9
1. See Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 N.D. 205, 2, 571 N.W.2d 332, 333.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. 4. Twila's formal counseling sessions with Gillette occurred once a week, on average,
beginning in February of 1990 and ending August 10, 1991. Appellee's Brief on Appeal at 2, Nelson
v. Gillette, 1997 N.D. 205, 571 N.W.2d 332 (No. 960371).
5. Nelson, U 3, 4, 571 N.W.2d at 333.
6. Id. 4.
7. Id. 1 3. Abbott admitted that she had access to Twila's file wherein Gillette had documented
that Twila was a "victim waiting to happen," that Twila "sexualizes everything," and that Twila told
him "anyone seventeen years old or who could 'get it up' could have sex with her just by asking."
Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 4, Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 N.D. 205, 571 N.W.2d 332 (No. 960371).
8. Nelson, 1 5, 571 N.W.2d at 333. Abbott notified the Bismarck Police Department, as well as
Twila's mother, Catherine Nelson, and Abbott's supervisor, Rita Weisz of the West Central Human
Service Center. Id.
9. Id. at 333-34.
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In 1994, Twila sued both Gillette and Kidder County, alleging
negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and vicarious liability. 10 Twila
subsequently released her claim against Gillette in exchange for a
confession of judgment of $250,000 which she agreed to collect from
Kidder County instead of Gillette.'' Kidder County then moved for
summary judgment and Twila conceded that she could not maintain the
negligent hiring claim since there was no evidence of prior abuse or
misconduct by Gillette that should have put Kidder County on notice. 12
The District Court for Burleigh County granted summary judgment in
favor of Kidder County on the vicarious liability and negligent supervi-
sion claims. 13 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
although the trial court's failure to use the Restatement (Second) of
Agency test to determine whether Gillette's actions were within the scope
of his employment was reversible error, Twila's release of Gillette also
served as a release of Kidder County.14 Therefore, summary judgment
on the vicarious liability claim was affirmed.15 However, the court also
determined that Twila's vulnerability, coupled with the phenomenon of
transference, made Gillette's sexual abuse of Twila foreseeable and as
such, summary judgment on the negligent supervision claim was re-
versed and remanded. 16
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND "SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT"
Of primary concern to the North Dakota Supreme Court was
determining how to gauge, for purposes of vicarious liability, whether an
employee's act was within the scope of employment.17 Normally, an
employer is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an employee done
in the "transaction of the employer's business" or in the "scope of




14. Id. 919 23, 36, 571 N.W.2d at 337, 340.
15. Id.
16. Id. 1[ 45, 48, 571 N.W.2d at 342.
17. Id. 7 13, 571 N.W.2d at 335.
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employment."1 8 Vicarious liability is the same concept as "respondeat
superior," the Latin legalistic term for "Let the master answer." 19
Application of vicarious liability results in making a "master"
answer for the wrongful acts of his "servant," even though the master
may have no personal fault.2 0 The master's liability is simply a conse-
quence of the employment relationship. 2' Imposition of vicarious
liability on a master is based on several public policy considerations
including: 1) since the employer benefits when the employee acts
properly, he should also share the cost when the employee acts
improperly; 22 2) the employer has "control" or the "right of control"
over the physical conduct of his employees; 23 and 3) the employer
should treat liability as a cost of doing business and in turn spread the
cost to the community at large.24
Vicarious liability traditionally applied only to private employers
since public employers received governmental immunity. 25 The concept
of governmental immunity stems from England, 26 but was transplanted
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 3-09-09 (1987); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 502 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. This imposition of liability
is additional, not substitutional, and thus, the employee/servant is still personally liable for the acts of
wrongdoing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Act-
ing as a servant does not confer any sort of personal immunity on the party committing the tortious act.
See id.
19. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990).
20. See Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 594 So.2d 571, 574 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (imposing lia-
bility on a hospital for the rape of one of its patients by a nursing assistant employed by the hospital
even though the act was unauthorized and motivated by the employee's personal interests). Control,
or the right of control, is essential to forming a master-servant relationship and thus, a master is often
defined as one who not only requests another "to perform service in his affairs," but who also "con-
trols or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other." RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2.
As a corollary, a servant is often defined as one who is employed to serve another and "whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or subject to the right to control by the
master." Id.
21. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2.
22. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 314
(Minn. 1982) (Peterson, J., dissenting) (stating that vicarious liability should be limited to situations
where an employer benefits from the employee's act and disagreeing with the majority's imposition of
vicarious liability on a clinic for the sexual assault of a patient by her psychiatrist because the clinic
did not benefit from the assault).
23. See id. at 313; Schwartz v. Ghaly, 318 N.W.2d 294, 301 (N.D. 1982).
24. See Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 350 (Alaska 1990) (Moore, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that it is fair to impose liability on an employer for an employee's tortious acts because the
employer can better distribute the cost of the loss through liability insurance or increased prices, but
disagreeing with the majority's imposition of vicarious liability on an employer for the sexual assault of
a patient by an employee during a counseling session between the two).
25. See Spielman v. State, 91 N.w.2d 627, 630 (N.D. 1958) (stating the general rule of immuni-
ty), overruled by Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., Inc., 521 N.w.2d 632, 636 (N.D. 1994) (concluding
that the language of the state constitution regarding suits against the state did not prevent the North
Dakota Supreme Court from abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity of the state from tort
liability).
26. See Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 360 (K. B. 1788).
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to the United States as early as 1812.27 The concept did not catch on
quickly in the Dakota Territory and in 1884, the Supreme Court of the
Dakota Territory held the city of Grand Forks liable to a man who broke
his leg on a poorly maintained street. 28
The doctrine of immunity eventually underwent several modifica-
tions that made the concept more generous to political subdivisions. 29
However, in 1974 the North Dakota Supreme Court abolished govern-
mental immunity for all governmental subdivisions, retaining immunity
only for "discretionary functions." 30  Governmental subdivision
liability was subsequently codified at North Dakota Century Code §
32-12.1-0331 and the statute now essentially makes political subdivisions
liable under the same circumstances that a private person would be
liable.32
Despite this imposition of liability, a political subdivision is not
responsible for every act of its employee. 33  Rather, the employer,
whether a private employer or a political subdivision, is responsible only
for those acts committed within the employee's "scope of
employment." 34 While the phrase "scope of employment" has been
defined in North Dakota for criminal law purposes, 35 it has not been
defined in terms of civil law.
36
27. See Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. (1 Tyng) 247, 250 (1812).
28. See Larson v. City of Grand Forks, 19 N.W. 414, 416 (Dakota 1884).
29. Montain v. City of Fargo, 166 N.W. 416, 417 (N.D. 1917) (delineating a difference between
"governmental" and "proprietary" functions, the former of which are immune from tort actions); Vail
v. Town of Amenia, 59 N.W. 1092, 1094 (N.D. 1894) (determining that while municipal corporations
are liable in tort, quasi-municipal corporations such as counties, townships, towns, and school districts
are not); Ludlow v. City of Fargo, 57 N.W. 506, 508 (N.D. 1893) (holding that municipalities are liable
for their wrongful acts even absent a statute authorizing suit).
30. See Kitto v. Minot Park District, 224 N.W.2d 795, 804 (N.D. 1974).
31. 1977 S.L. ch. 303 § 3.
32. See Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Resource Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 508 (N.D. 1987).
Liability of political subdivisions is nonetheless limited to $250,000 per person and $500,000 per
occurrence. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03 (1996). Furthermore, the purchase of liability insurance
constitutes a waiver of any claim of governmental immunity that a political subdivision may have.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-05 (1996).
33. See id.
34. See Binstock v. Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist., 463 N.W.2d 837, 841-42 (N.D. 1990) (stating that
an employer is only liable for those acts of its employees that are committed within the scope of
employment).
35. See State v. Smokey's Steakhouse, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 361, 362 (N.D. 1991) (stating that for
criminal law purposes, an employee is acting within the scope of employment if: 1) the employee has
authority to conduct the particular business that was done criminally; 2) the employee was acting, at
least in part, in furtherance of the corporation's interests; and 3) the corporate management
authorized, tolerated, or ratified the criminal acts).
36. See Nelson v. Gillette, No. 94-C-2906, slip op. at A-9 (Dist. Ct. Burleigh County 1997)
(stating that this is an issue of first impression in the jurisdiction). Without defining what the phrase
means, the North Dakota Supreme Court has used scope of employment terminology before, such as in
Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc. v. Larson, 391 N.W.2d 627, 633 (N.D. 1986) where the
court stated, "Generally, a corporation is responsible for the acts of its employees if done on its behalf
and within the scope of the employee's authority (citations omitted)." In Rickbeil v. Grafton
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"Scope of employment" generally does not have a fixed or
technical definition and it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.37
Indeed, the phrase "scope of employment" has been referred to as a
"highly indefinite phrase which ... is so devoid of meaning in itself that
its very vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of
flexibility in decisions." 38
In an attempt to delineate the meaning of "scope of employment,"
many jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Agency 39
test which considers an act to be within the scope of employment if: 1) it
is of the kind the person is employed to perform;4 0 2) it occurred
substantially within authorized time and space limitations; 3) it was
motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and 4) if the
employee intentionally used force against another employee, and the use
of force was not unforeseeable by the employer. 4' Other jurisdictions
have adopted a "motivation to serve" formulation whereby a servant's
act is not within the scope of employment if "it is done with no intention
to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he
is employed." 42
Deaconess Hosp., 23 N.W.2d 247, 257 (1946), the court quoted, "It is a conceded general rule that all
persons or entities are liable for torts committed by them, or by their agents while acting within the
scope of their duties (citations omitted)," without further addressing how to determine whether an
agent's act was within the scope of employment.
37. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311
(Minn. 1982).
38. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 70.
39. Restatement, supra note 18, § 228.
40. This portion of the test is further explained by RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF AGENCY § 229(2)
(1958), which states that certain matters of fact are to be considered when determining whether
tortious conduct is so similar to or incidental to authorized conduct as to be within .he scope of
employment, including: whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants; the time, place
and purpose of the act; the previous relations between the master and the servant; the extent to which
the business of the master is apportioned between different servants; whether or not the act is outside
the enterprise of the master or, if within the enterprise, has not been entrusted to any servant; whether
or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done; the similarity in quality of the act
done to the act authorized; whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been
furnished by the master to the servant; the extent of departure from the normal method of
accomplishing an authorized result; and whether or not the act is seriously criminal.
41. See Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 347-48 (Alaska 1990) (accepting the
Restatement four-part test as a useful guideline and rejecting a threshold "motivation to serve" test for
determining whether an employee's act was within the scope of employment); Samuels v. Southern
Baptist Hosp., 594 So.2d 571, 573 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (indicating that an act is within the scope of
employment if it is primarily employment rooted, reasonably incidental to the employee's duties, and if
it occurred on the employer's premises during hours of employment); Erickson v. Christenson, 781
P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that an act is within the scope of employment if it occurs
substantially within employment authorized time and space limits, the employee is motivated, at least
partially, by a purpose to serve the employer, and the act is of the kind the employee was hired to
perform).
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 235. Many courts have adopted this theory and hold that
unless a servant's acts further the master's expectations, the acts are not within the scope of employ-
ment. See Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 463 (N.C. 1990) (noting that in order to impose liability on
an employer for the tortious acts of an employee, the employee must be acting within the scope of
employment and in furtherance of the employer's business); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 520 A.2d 844,
846-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (requiring that for an employee's act to be within the scope of
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Additional jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, have adopted a combi-
nation of the tests.43 For example, the court in Marston v. Minneapolis
Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd.44 articulated a two-part test
whereby negligent acts are within the scope of employment if the
employee is acting in furtherance of the employer's interests.
4 5
However, for intentional acts to be in the scope of employment, the court
in Marston stated that the conduct must have only occurred within
work-related time and space limits and have been fairly foreseen from
the nature the employment and the duties related to it.46
B. NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND TRANSFERENCE
In addition to Twila's vicarious liability claim against Kidder
County, the North Dakota Supreme Court also addressed her negligent
supervision claim against the County.47 Negligent supervision is a form
of direct liability, rather than indirect or vicarious liability. 48 However,
the negligent supervision theory of liability derives from the respondeat
superior doctrine and as a result, recovery is predicated upon a showing
that the tortious act complained of occurred within the scope of
employment. 49 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a master
employment the conduct must have: 1) been the kind the employee was employed to perform; 2)
occurred substantially within authorized time and space limitations; and 3) been motivated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the employer, but placing particular emphasis on the last element in holding
that a hospital was not liable for one of its therapist's sexual acts with a patient because the therapist
was not motivated by a desire to serve the hospital); Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420,
426 (Wash. 1997) (stating that when an employee moves away from serving his employer's purposes
in order to serve a personal objective of his own, his act is outside the scope of employment).
43. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 310
(Minn. 1982).
44. 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1982).
45. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311
(Minn. 1982).
46. Id. at 311 n.3; see also Turner v. State, 494 So.2d 1292, 1295-96 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (conclud-
ing that the National Guard would be liable for the recruiting officer's unauthorized sexual conduct
during a physical exam and premising liability on the grounds that the sexual act was "incidental" to
the employment and "attributable" to the employer). But see Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l
Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 365 n.6 (Cal. 1995) (refusing to impose respondeat superior liability on a hospital
for a sexual assault perpetrated by an ultrasound technician on a pregnant client because:
An analysis that, in the field of health care, deems a conscious sexual assault to have
arisen from the employment simply because the patient involved was vulnerable, sur-
rendered his or her privacy or submitted to physical contact unusual for strangers in a
non-medical context, would, in effect, expose health care providers to potential liability
without fault for sexual assault by virtually any employee on any patient).
47. See Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 N.D. 205, 37, 571 N.W.2d 332, 340-42.
48. See Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (Minn. 1983) (stating that an employer
has a direct duty to members of the public, and noting that this form of direct liability is distinguishable
from imputed or vicarious liability).
49. See M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (describing the theory of
negligent supervision liability). This scope of employment connection can usually be established when
the tortious act involved an employer's chattel or occurred on the employer's premises. See Yunker
v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing recovery to a decedent's
next of kin on a negligent supervision theory after the decedent was shot and killed by a co-worker
because the assault did not occur on the employer's premises and because the employer's chattels
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has a duty to control the acts of his servant which occur within the scope
of employment so as to prevent him from intentionally harming or
creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others. 50 This duty is imposed
if the servant is oh the master's premises or is using the master's chattel
and the master knows, or has reason to know, that he has the ability to
control his servant and knows, or should know, of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control. 51
In a negligent supervision action, a plaintiff generally must prove
that the employer failed to use ordinary care in supervising an employee
by not preventing that employee's foreseeable misconduct. 52 Several
jurisdictions have embraced the notion of negligent supervision as an
independent action against an employer. 53
III. ANALYSIS
A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND "SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT"
In addressing Twila's vicarious liability claim against Kidder
County, the North Dakota Supreme Court gave a cursory explanation of
the background of the vicarious liability doctrine within the state. 54 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Kidder County and
held that the County could not be vicariously liable because although the
alleged acts occurred within work related time and space limitations,
Gillette's employment was not such that sexual activity was a likely
result.55 Furthermore, the trial court noted that there was no evidence
that Gillette's acts served Kidder County or that Gillette thought he was
were not used to cause the harm).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) [hereinafter TORTS]. This risk of harm must
result in actual physical injury or a threat of actual physical injury to the plaintiff. See Bruchas v.
Preventive Care, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (construing recovery under a
negligent supervision theory of liability to require actual physical harm or a threat of actual physical
harm, and refusing to impose such liability on an employer whose employee was verbally sexually
harassed at work because the employee neither suffered nor was threatened with physical injury).
51. TORTS, supra note 50, § 317. Negligent supervision liability can also be based on the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958) which provides that "a person conducting an activity through
servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or
reckless ... in the supervision of the activity." Bruchas, 553 N.W.2d at 443 (discussing the different
origins of negligent supervision liability).
52. See Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d at 858 (refusing to impose negligent supervision liability on a
church for the sexual abuse perpetrated by one of its pastors because there was no evidence that the
amount of supervision exercised materially differed from that which a reasonable church would
provide, or that increased supervision would have prevented the abuse from occurring).
53. See id. (acknowledging the negligent supervision cause of action in Minnesota); Niece v.
Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420, 427 (Wash. 1997) (acknowledging the negligent supervision
cause of action and stating that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 elements are required to
establish an action for negligent supervision).
54. Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 N.D. 205, 91 10-19, 571 N.W.2d 332, 334-35.
55. Id. 11,571 N.W.2d at 334.
1999]
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serving Kidder County. 56  This statement constituted an implicit
adoption of the "motivation to serve" test.57
On appeal, Kidder County argued for affirmation of the "motiva-
tion to serve" test and presented a laundry list of jurisdictions accepting
that formulation of the "scope of employment" test. 58 In particular, the
County asserted that since sexual conduct is inherently self-motivated, it
can never be within the scope of employment. 59 In turn, Twila argued
for the Marston test as set forth above, and also presented a list of
jurisdictional holdings adopting a formulation similar to the Marston test
and rejecting the "motivation to serve" test as a threshold issue.60
The North Dakota Supreme Court primarily relied on three resourc-
es: the Restatement test, the Alaska case of Doe v. Samaritan Counseling
Center,61 and the North Dakota case of Lippmann v. Workmen's Compen-
sation Bureau62 to formulate its definition of "scope of employ-
ment."63 Noting that it had never defined "scope of employment" for
purposes of an intentional tort by an employee, the court stated that
since there was nothing in the legislative history of sections 32-12.1-03
and 32-12.1-04 of the NDCC to aid in its definition, it would look to
related law and decisions for guidance. 64
Prior to considering any case law, the North Dakota Supreme Court
reiterated the "scope of employment" definition furnished by the
American Law Institute in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 65 The
court then examined the Alaska case of Doe v. Samaritan Counseling
Center which it approvingly discussed as adopting all of the elements of
56. Id.
57. Nelson v. Gillette, No. 94-C-2906, Slip Op. at A-10 (Dist. Ct. Burleigh County 1997).
58. See Appellee's Brief on Appeal at 9-10, Nelson (No. 960371).
59. See id. (citing Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 464 (N.C. 1990) (discussing that intentional
tortious acts are rarely within the scope of employment)); Nelson, 14, 571 N.W.2d at 335. But see
Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 594 So.2d 571, 573 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (stating the fact that the
primary motive of an employee is to benefit himself does not prevent his tortious act from being within
the scope of employment); RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, §§ 230-31 (stating that an act, although
forbidden, may be within the scope of employment and that consciously criminal and tortious acts may
also be within the scope of employment).
60. See Nelson, 1 15-17, 571 N.W.2d at 335-36. One court went so far as to say that a blanket
rule holding sexual acts outside the scope of employment would draw an unprincipled distinction
between those kinds of assaults and others committed in response to other personal motivations such as
anger or financial pressure. Stropes v. Heritage House Children's Ctr. of Shelbyville, 547 N.E.2d 244,
249 (Ind. 1990).
61. 791 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1990).
62. 55 N.W.2d 453, 458 (N.D. 1952).
63. Nelson, 120, 571 N.W.2d at 337 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 228 (1958));
Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1990); Lippmann v. North Dakota
Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 55 N.W.2d 453, 458 (N.D. 1952)).
64. Id. 91 18, 571 N.W.2d at 336-37 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39(4) (1987) which states
that a court shall consider common law and former statutory provisions, including law regarding the
same or similar subjects, in determining legislative intent).
65. Id. 1 13, 571 N.W.2d at 335 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)).
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section 228 of the Restatement.66 However, the court was careful to note
that Alaska found the "motivation to serve" element satisfied when the
employee's tortious conduct arose out of and was reasonably incidental
to the employee's legitimate work activities. 67 Summarizing the Alaska
Supreme Court's decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court echoed that
court's recognition that many jurisdictions use the "motivation to
serve" question as a threshold issue. 68 The court in Nelson agreed with
the Alaska Supreme Court's rejection of the "motivation to serve"
approach because use of the motivation issue as a threshold question
would significantly undercut the purpose behind vicarious liability. 69
The court also discussed the case of Lippmann v. North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, a worker's compensation case, which
stated that an act is within the scope of employment if it occurs while the
employee is doing what he is employed to do, during the time for which
he is employed to do it, and at a place where he may be reasonably
doing that act.70 The court determined that the definition set forth in
Lippmann was similar to the scope of employment test established in
section 228 of the Restatement. 7 1 The court announced that it would
base its decision on the definitions articulated in Doe, Lippmann, and
section 228.72 In addition, the court concluded that all of the elements
of section 228 must be considered in determining whether an
employee's intentional tortious act is within the scope of employment. 73
66. Id. 17, 571 N.W.2d at 336 (citing Doe, 791 P.2d at 347-48).
67. Id. (citing Doe, 791 P.2d at 347-48).
68. Id. (citing Doe, 791 P.2d at 348-49).
69. Id. (citing Doe, 791 P.2d at 349). Interestingly, Alaska has traditionally been considered an
"enterprise liability" state whereby the acts of employees that are "sufficiently connected" with the
employer's enterprise are characterized "as deeds of the enterprise itself." Fruit v. Schreiner, 502
P.2d 133, 140-41 (Alaska 1972). Alaska has thus interpreted the basis for respondeat superior to be
"the desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on
an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefitted by the enterprise." Id. (quoting
Smith, Frolic & Detour, 23 COL. L. REV. 716, 718 (1923)). Other courts faced with the prospect of
adopting Alaska's enterprise liability approach to respondeat superior have expressly rejected it
indicating that:
Courts generally 'decline to impose a rule, the ramifications of which would be
far-reaching and which would rearrange, across the state, the responsibility of
employers for the conduct of their employees. Such a redirection of social policy is,
more appropriately, the function of the legislature. We agree with this rationale and
reject the theory of enterprise liability.
Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 387 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted); see also
Kuehn v. White, 600 P.2d 679, 683 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting the enterprise theory of liability
as a basis for respondeat superior).
70. Nelson, 19, 571 N.W.2d at 337 (citing Lippmann v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp.
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Turning to public policy concerns, the court stated that this defini-
tion of "scope of employment" served the traditional rationale of
imputed responsibility in terms of providing a victim with a remedy
when that person is injured by an individual with limited means. 74 The
definition also served the modem rationale that an enterprise should bear
the risk of a tort committed by a person who carries on the enterprise. 75
The court stated that it would be "counterintuitive" to make an
employer liable for its employee's negligent acts, but not the
employee's intentional acts.76 Comparing the custody of children to the
custody of bank funds, the court concluded that it would be unthinkable
to let a bank evade responsibility for an employee's embezzlement of a
customer's money simply because the employee's acts did not serve the
employer's purposes.77
Asserting that the custody of children is no less important than the
custody of funds, the court stated that as in Marston, Kidder County
placed Gillette in the position that enabled him to abuse Twila. 78 Quot-
ing the maxim of equity, "[w]here one of two innocent parties must
suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it," the
court remarked that a victim's need for a remedy may be even greater
with an intentional tort than with a negligent tort.79 The court conclud-
ed that restricting the definition of "scope of employment" to include a
threshold motivation to serve the employer requirement could deny a
victim a remedy when it is most needed.80
In turn, the court stated that because Gillette's abuse of Twila
occurred during business hours and at business locations, there was a
disputed question of fact concerning whether Gillette's actions were
within the scope of employment, which would warrant reversal and
remand. 81 However, liability in the case was affected by a related rule of
vicarious liability that the trial court had not considered; that is, whether
Twila's release of Gillette also released Kidder County.82
74. Id. 1 21 (citing 57B AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 1753 (1989)).
75. Id. (citing 57B AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 1753 (1989)). For a discussion of the controversy
surrounding the enterprise liability basis for respondeat superior see supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
76. Nelson, 21, 571 N.W.2d at 337.
77. Id. 1 22.
78. Id. (citing Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306, 311
(Minn. 1982) (stating that it was only through the employment relationship that the therapist in that case
was able to abuse the plaintiff, his patient)).
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing 57B AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 1754 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-05(34)
(1996)).
81. Id. 23 (citing Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 311).
82. See id. ; see also Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D. 1984) (discussing that
when an injured party releases a servant, he also releases his ability to collect from the servant's
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Pursuant to North Dakota statute,83 no public employee is liable in a
personal capacity for acts occurring in the scope of employment, unless
the acts constitute "reckless or grossly negligent conduct, or willful or
wanton conduct." 84 The court concluded that since Gillette used his
position of authority to extract sexual favors from Twila, his behavior
could be characterized as wanton, and therefore, he could be held
personally liable. 85 Furthermore, when an employer is vicariously liable
for the torts of an employee, the employer is entitled to
indemnification. 86 As such, Kidder County could seek indemnification
from Gillette for any damages Twila might prove.87 However, the court
noted that this right of indemnification would make Gillette's settlement
agreement worthless and would establish a vicious circle of indemnity
between master and servant. 88 In turn, the court determined that Twila's
release of Gillette also released Kidder County from vicarious liability
for his acts and affirmed the district court's summary judgment against
Twila on her vicarious liability claim.89
B. NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND TRANSFERENCE
The court then examined Twila's negligent supervision claim
against Kidder County.90 Therein, Twila argued that Kidder County had
a duty to protect its foster care wards from being sexually abused by its
employees, and that since she was known to be sexually promiscuous, the
potential for someone to sexually abuse her was foreseeable by the
County.9 1 The trial court determined that Kidder County had satisfacto-
rily supervised Gillette since an investigation ensued after Abbott was
notified of the suspected abuse and because there was no evidence of
misconduct prior to that time to put the County on notice.92
Taking a different approach, the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated that apart from vicarious liability, an employer can be directly
liable for "negligent supervision" whereby the employer fails "to
master for any purely vicarious liability the master may have).
83. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-04(3) (1996).
84. Nelson, 25, 571 N.W.2d at 337-38 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-04(3) (1996)).
85. Id. 27.
86. Id. 26 (citing Herman v. General Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472, 480 (N.D. 1976)).
87. Id. 28.
88. Id. 1 35, 571 N.W.2d at 339. To illustrate its point, the court referred to two North Dakota
cases, Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316, 320 (N.D. 1984), and LC. v. R.P., 563 N.W.2d 799, 801
(N.D. 1997), wherein the court held in a babysitter abuse and pastoral abuse case, respectively, that
the release of a servant must serve as a release of a master in order to avoid a cycle of indemnity.
See id., [ 29-31, 571 N.W.2d at 338-39. The "indemnity cycle" occurs when an employer is
vicariously liable for an employee's act and in turn, seeks indemnification from the employee for the
damages it owed as a result of the vicarious liability. See Horejsi, 353 N.W.2d at 319.
89. Nelson, 1 35-6, 571 N.W.2d at 339-40.
90. Id. 1 37, 571 N.W.2d at 340.
91. Id.
92. Id. 1 38.
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exercise ordinary care in supervising the employment relationship, so as
to prevent the foreseeable misconduct of an employee from causing
harm to other employees or third persons." 93 Following the rule
delineated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 94 the court reported that
the only instances where an employer is under a duty to control his
employees are when an employee is on the employer's premises or
using the employer's chattel, and the employer knows or should know
that he can control his employee and knows that it is necessary to
exercise such control.95
Concluding that Kidder County was capable of supervising Gillette
and that Kidder County should have known of the need and opportunity
for exercising control to protect Twila, the court asserted that the legal
custodian of a juvenile has a non-delegable duty to provide for the
juvenile's protection and physical welfare. 96 In addition, experience,
news stories, and advance sheets are replete with evidence that the risk for
the sexual abuse of children is widely known and foreseeable. 97 Posing
as a significant risk factor for sexual abuse, the court pointed to the
phenomenon of transference as a determinative factor in deciding that
Twila's abuse was foreseeable. 98
Discussing the phenomenon of transference, the court approvingly
cited the Wisconsin case of Steven G. by Robert G. v. Herget,99 and
described transference as the emotional reaction a patient in therapy has
towards a therapist whereby the patient "transfers" the emotions the
patient has towards individuals in the patient's past onto the therapist.100
93. Id. 1 39 (citing M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)). An analogy
can be drawn between Magnuson and the instant case because like the pastor in Magnuson who
required "privacy and confidentiality in order to protect the privacy of parishioners," social workers
like Gillette often predicate their relationships with their clients on a mutual understanding of trust and
confidence. 531 N.W.2d at 858.
94. See TORTS, supra note 50, § 317.
95. Nelson, 41, 571 N.W.2d at 340-41.
96. Id. It 41, 42, 571 N.W.2d at 341 (citing N.D. CENTr. CODE § 27-20-38 (1991)).
97. Id. 42.
98. Id. 43.
99. 505 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Wis. 1993).
100. Nelson, 44, 571 N.W.2d at 341 (citing Steven G by Robert G., 505 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Wis.
1993)). Transference usually occurs when the patient, required to reveal inner thoughts and feelings,
develops an intense relationship with the therapist and in essence, "falls in love" with the therapist.
See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. 1990). In turn, the therapist
must reject the patient's erotic thoughts and explain to the patient the true origin of the feelings. See
id. If a therapist does not reject the patient's overtures and develops a sexual relationship with the
patient, this can be highly damaging to the patient because the relationship would be "replicating at a
symbolic level the situation in which a parent would be sexual with a child" since the transference
phenomenon symbolizes the parent-child relationship. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365
(9th Cir. 1986). Furthermore,
The impacts of sexual involvement with one's counselor are more severe than the
impacts of merely 'having an affair' for two major reasons: first, because the client's
attraction is based on transference, the sexual contact is ordinarily akin to engaging in
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The court noted that mental health professionals, such as social workers,
are acutely aware of transference, that it occurs in most counseling
relationships, and that effective counseling generally relies on its
occurrence. 101 The court indicated that a number of cases have conclud-
ed that ineffective handling of transference makes sexual contact be-
tween a counselor and a patient foreseeable. 102 The Minnesota Supreme
Court has also recognized that sexual contact between a psychologist and
a patient is a "well known hazard."' 103 The court then concluded that
the known history of Twila's promiscuity coupled with the known risk
of mishandling the transference phenomenon, made Twila's abuse
foreseeable and Kidder County should have taken steps to protect her.104
In turn, the court reversed and remanded Twila's negligent supervision
claim against the County.105
1. Chief Justice VandeWalle's Concurrence and Dissent
In a separate opinion, Chief Justice VandeWalle expressed serious
doubts about the phenomenon of transference. 106 He stated that even if
the phenomenon applies to therapists, he doubted that social workers are
"therapists," especially in light of the court's prior refusal to recognize
a social worker as a therapist under North Dakota Rule of Evidence
sexual activity with a parent, and carries with it the feelings of shame, guilt and anxiety
experienced by incest victims. Second, the client is usually suffering from all or some of
the psychological problems that brought him or her into therapy to begin with. As a
result, the client is especially vulnerable to the added stress created by the feelings of
shame, guilt and anxiety produced by the incestuous nature of the relationship, and by the
sense of betrayal that is felt when the client eventually learns that she is not 'special' as
she had been led to believe, and that her trust has been violated.
Id. at 1367.
101. Nelson, 43, 571 N.W.2d at 341. See generally 14 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 319, § 3
(1991 & Supp. 1996) (providing a general overview of the transference concept).
102. Nelson, 45, 571 N.w.2d at 341 (citing Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365 (reporting that courts
have uniformly regarded the mishandling of transference to be malpractice or gross negligence);
Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1358 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussing the
application of transference to a medical malpractice action where a physician engaged in sexual
relations with a patient); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 129 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982) (concluding that an expert opinion was required to aid in determining whether the mishandling
of transference was negligence); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn.
1990) (stating that the medical and legal communities are in agreement that mishandling of the
transference phenomenon is malpractice or gross negligence); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753,
761 (Mo. 1968) (determining that a physician's mishandling of transference caused his patient's
injuries)); see generally Davidson, Psychiatry's Problem With No Name: Therapist-Patient Sex, 37
AM. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS, 43, 48-49 (1977) (stating that therapist-patient sex is psychologically damaging
to the patient and unethical for the practitioner); Stone, The Legal Implications of Sexual Activity
Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1138, 1139 (1976) (explaining that there are
no circumstances which would permit a psychiatrist to engage in sexual relations with a patient and
that having sex with a patient constitutes the misuse of transference).
103. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, 329 N.w.2d 306, 311 (Minn.
1982).
104. Nelson, 45, 571 N.W.2d at 342.
105. Id. 48.
106. Id. 52 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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503.107 Noting that the County does have a duty to protect its wards,
Chief Justice VandeWalle stated that the duty was restricted to only those
injuries that were foreseeable.1 08 Reporting that there was "nothing in
this record" to make the abuse of Twila foreseeable, Chief Justice
VandeWalle remarked that the majority opinion reinforced the stereo-
type that "men will succumb to a young woman's wiles" and that the
majority opinion was a disservice, if not an indication of gender bias, to
male social workers who have not acted inappropriately.109
2. Justice Sandstrom's Concurrence and Dissent
Also in a separate opinion, Justice Sandstrom called into question
the foreseeability of Twila's abuse.ll0 Summarizing the evidence that
was in existence, Justice Sandstrom reported that the only things Gil-
lette's supervisor actually knew were: 1) that Twila was moderately
retarded; 2) that Twila was a promiscuous teen; 3) that Gillette was
Twila's male social worker; and 4) that Gillette occasionally gave Twila
rides to her mother's house."' Justice Sandstrom asserted that the
majority misconstrued the application of transference since most of the
courts relied on by the majority stated that the mishandling of
transference is malpractice or gross negligence, not that the mishandling
of transference makes sexual contact foreseeable.11 2 Contrasting the
instant case with the Simmons v. United States1 13 case cited by the
majority and with D.E.M. v. Allickson,11 4 a North Dakota case with a
similar fact pattern, Justice Sandstrom stated that the primary difference
between the cases was that in Simmons and D.E.M. the employer had
information to put it on notice that some impropriety was occurring,
whereas Kidder County had only the information enumerated above
upon which to base its actions. 115 Concluding that sexual contact
between social workers and their clients is neither a well-known hazard,
nor foreseeable, Justice Sandstrom stated that the County had no indica-
107. Id. (citing State v. Copeland, 448 N.W.2d 611, 616 (N.D. 1989)). North Dakota Rule of
Evidence 503(a)(3) defines a psychotherapist as an individual authorized to practice medicine or an
individual licensed or certified as a psychologist. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (1997)
which, for purposes of sexual exploitation by a therapist, includes social workers within the definition
of a therapist if the social worker "purports to perform psychotherapy."
108. Nelson, 53, 571 N.W.2d at 343 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
109. Id. 54.
110. Id. 63 (Sandstrom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Id. 61.
112. Id. 1 63 (citing Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986)).
113. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. 555 N.W.2d 596, 603 (N.D. 1996).








This case established for the first time the North Dakota test for
determining whether an employee's intentional acts constitute wrongful
conduct within the scope of employment for vicarious liability purposes.
In addition, although the case discussed for the first time the phenome-
non of transference, the precise impact of this case within North Dakota
has yet to be determined.11 7 The case has been cited three times: once
for the proposition that statutes are to be read in harmony,"i 8 and once
for the precept that political subdivisions are vicariously liable for the
tortious acts of their employees that are done within the scope of
employment. 119
Most recently, the case was cited in a footnote by the North Dakota
Supreme Court for its definition and discussion of the transference
phenomena.120 This citation occurred in an opinion authored by Chief
Justice VandeWalle, wherein a unanimous court vacated a summary
judgment declaring that an insurance company had a duty to defend and
indemnify a physician for damages he may become obligated to pay to
a patient "for medical malpractice involving the negligent handling of
patient transference."121 In the opinion, the court stated that there were
genuine issues of material fact regarding whether mishandling transfer-
ence in the particular situation constituted medical malpractice, whether
the physician was actually counseling the plaintiff-patient, and whether
the alleged sexual acts surrounding the patient's claim occurred during
her treatment. 122 Although arising in the context of a medical malprac-
tice setting rather than a negligent employment setting, it is interesting
that the court unanimously embraced the phenomena, given the prior
disagreement among the court in Nelson. 123
116. Id.
117. Id. 9H 20, 43-46, 571 N.W.2d at 337, 341-42.
118. See Twichell v. Treitline, 1998 N.D. 10, 13, 574 N.W.2d 194, 197.
119. See Tracy v. Central Cass Pub. Sch. Dist., 1998 N.D. 12, 6, 574 N.W.2d 781, 782.
120. See Midwest Medical Ins. Co., v. Doe, 1999 N.D. 17, 14 n.1, - N.W.2d.
121. Id. , N.W.2d.
122. Id. I I, __ N.W.2d _. The court conceded that generally whenever "a therapist or
counselor mishandles transference and becomes sexually involved with a patient, the conduct is
considered malpractice." Id. 1 6 n.2, __ N.W.2d _. However, the court also noted that expert
testimony and resolution of questions of fact are usually required to determine if a specific instance of
mishandling transference actually constituted malpractice. Id. I l1, - N.W.2d _
123. Compare Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 N.D. 205, 45, 571 N.W.2d 322, 341-42 (setting forth the
majority's acceptance of the transference phenomenon) with Nelson, 52, 571 N.W.2d at 342
(VandeWalle, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning the concept in general and
doubting whether a social worker constitutes a therapist) with Nelson, U 63, 64, 571 N.W.2d at 343-44
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The attorneys on either side of this case have slightly differing ideas
regarding the potential impact of the decision.124 Keith Miller, attorney
for Twila Nelson, expects Nelson to be widely cited.125 He believes that
the "scope of employment" test articulated in Nelson will not be limited
to the vicarious liability of political subdivisions, but may also be applied
to private employers.126 Further, he asserts that North Dakota's refusal
to dwell on the "motivation to serve" part of the test will serve as a basis
for reconsideration by other jurisdictions. 127 Mr. Miller also reports that
transference as a basis for foreseeability will probably have an even
greater impact than the scope of employment test for actions involving
negligent supervision.128
Scott Porsborg, attorney for Kidder County, believes the essence of
Nelson is that inappropriate intimacy is foreseeable in certain counseling
relationships, particularly those wherein transference occurs. 129 Noting
that many of the cases discussing transference cite scientific and
non-scientific evidence both in favor of, and against, this proposition,
Mr. Porsborg believes that the continued viability of Nelson may hinge
to a degree on the continued evolution of what is known about trans-
ference.130 Mr. Porsborg also states that the scope of employment test
adopted in Nelson will likely apply to both private and public employers
alike.131
One question left unresolved by this case is whether each of the
elements of the Restatement test simply has to be considered, with the
court weighing each element accordingly, or if each of the elements has
to be met in order for an act to be within the scope of employment. In
(Sandstrom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the application of trans-
ference to social workers). This disagreement regarding transference is not unique to the North
Dakota Supreme Court as at least three members of the Minnesota Supreme Court have expressed
doubt concerning the application of transference to individuals other than psychiatrists and
psychologists. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. 1990)
(Coyne, J., dissenting) (stating that although it is not unheard of for a client to fall in love with a family
doctor or attorney and vice versa, the justice was "unaware of the conduct of any of those
professionals having been characterized as the 'mishandling of the transference phenomenon' or
succumbing to an occupational hazard . . . [and that] such circumstances have always been
recognized for what they are(conduct removed from the professional relationship").
124. Compare Letter from Keith Miller, Attorney, Miller, Norman & Associates, to Crystal
Ovsak, Staff Member, North Dakota Law Review (July 30, 1998) (on file with author) with Letter from
Scott Porsborg, Attorney, Smith, Bakke, Hovland & Oppegard to Crystal Ovsak (September 10, 1998)
(on file with author).
125. Letter from Keith Miller, supra note 124.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Given the court's recent discussion of transference in Doe, Mr. Miller's prediction may
be correct. 1999 N.D. 17, 1 11, _ N.W.2d _; see also supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
129. Letter from Scott Porsborg, supra note 124. Given the court's recent discussion of trans-
ference in Doe, Mr. Porsborg's prediction may also be correct. 1999 N.D. 17, 1, _ N.W.2d _; see
also supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.




adopting the Restatement test, the court stated that "all of the elements
of the Restatement Section 228 must be considered to assess whether an
employee [acted] within the scope of employment."1 32 However, the
court also stated that a question of fact existed as to whether "Gillette's
conduct met all the elements of the legal test of 'scope of employ-
ment."' 133 Because there is a significant difference between "consider-
ing" and "meeting" all of the elements of a test, this is an area of
ambiguity, particularly since the Doe opinion relied on by the majority
expressly refused to require that all of the elements of the test be met
before an act would be deemed within the scope of employment.1 34 It
will be interesting to see how this ambiguity is resolved, as well as how
the scope of employment test will be used and modified in the future.
Furthermore, it will also be interesting to see how the phenomena of
transference continues to influence employer liability, particularly in the
remanded trial between Twila Nelson and Burleigh County on the
negligent supervision issue.
Crystal M. Ovsak
132. Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 ND 205, 1 20, 571 N.W.2d 332, 337 (emphasis added).
133. Id. 23 (emphasis added).
134. Id. 17, 571 N.W.2d at 336 (citing Doe v. Good Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344,
349 (Alaska 1990) (reiterating its rejection of the view that each of the Restatement factors must be
satisfied for an act to be within the scope of employment)).
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